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Abstract
Background: In many scientific disciplines the use of a metaphor as an heuristic aid is not uncommon. A well known
example in somatic medicine is the ‘defense army metaphor’ used to characterize the immune system. In fact, probably a
large part of the everyday work of doctors consists of ‘translating’ scientific and clinical information (i.e. causes of disease,
percentage of succes versus risk of side-effects) into information tailored to the needs and capacities of the individual
patient. The ability to do so in an effective way is at least partly what makes a clinician a good communicator. Schizophrenia
is a severe psychiatric disorder which affects approximately 1% of the population. Over the last two decades a large amount
of molecular-biological, imaging and genetic data have been accumulated regarding the biological underpinnings of
schizophrenia. However, it remains difficult to understand how the characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia such as
hallucinations and delusions are related to disturbances on the molecular-biological level. In general, psychiatry seems to
lack a conceptual framework with sufficient explanatory power to link the mental- and molecular-biological domains.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we present an essay-like study in which we propose to use visualized concepts
stemming from the theory on dynamical complex systems as a ‘visual metaphor’ to bridge the mental- and molecular-
biological domains in schizophrenia. We first describe a computer model of neural information processing; we show how
the information processing in this model can be visualized, using concepts from the theory on complex systems. We then
describe two computer models which have been used to investigate the primary theory on schizophrenia, the
neurodevelopmental model, and show how disturbed information processing in these two computer models can be
presented in terms of the visual metaphor previously described. Finally, we describe the effects of dopamine
neuromodulation, of which disturbances have been frequently described in schizophrenia, in terms of the same visualized
metaphor.
Conclusions/Significance: The conceptual framework and metaphor described offers a heuristic tool to understand the
relationship between the mental- and molecular-biological domains in an intuitive way. The concepts we present may serve
to facilitate communication between researchers, clinicians and patients.
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Introduction
Schizophrenia is a severe psychiatric disorder, characterized by
the emergence at adolescence of psychotic phenomena: halluci-
nations, delusions and bizarre behavior. The neurodevelopmental
hypothesis, which proposes a leading role for early aberrant brain
development on which normal and/or abnormal brain maturation
is superimposed has become the dominant paradigm for
understanding the development of schizophrenia. The neurode-
velopmental theory is usually underscored by a large amount of
molecular-biological, imaging and genetic data which have been
accumulated over the last two decades. Taken together, these
findings point to reduced neuronal connectivity and synaptic
stability. Psychotic symptoms are considered to be emergent
properties on the psychological and behavioral level of the
aberrantly developed neural system which start when during
brain development a critical threshold is passed.
However, it remains difficult to understand how psychotic
symptoms are related to disturbances on the molecular-biological
level. Kapur [1] described this as: ‘‘doctor-patient interaction
proceeds mainly at a ‘mind’ or ‘behavioral’ level of description.
On the other hand, the preeminent theories regarding psychosis
(…) are mainly neurobiological’’. We think this is a major problem
in contemporary psychiatry because it impedes researchers to
convey findings to patients, clinicians, and the general community.
The problem is that psychiatry as a science seems to lack a
coherent system of terms linking the mental and molecular-
biological domains [2].
In somatic medicine the use of some kind of metaphor to bridge
the biological and phenomenological domains is not uncommon.
For instance, the immune system is characterized by the defense-
army metaphor. Though the immune system is notoriously
difficult on a molecular level, and the specific molecular
phenomena which happen during, say, an HIV infection, may
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be only within the grasp of experts, the defense-army metaphor
functions as a bridge between lay and professionals and facilitates
understanding in an intuitive way.
In this article we attempt to outline a heuristic framework that
could provide a basis for uniting clinical phenomena and
neurobiological theories. We will introduce what we have coined
a ‘visual metaphor’ which is supposed to bridge the mental and
neural domains. To this end we will combine two fields of
research, namely the study of the behavior of complex systems and
computer models of schizophrenia.
During the last two decades a large body of literature has
appeared concerning the study of complex systems and its
associated theoretical framework ‘complexity theory’ [3,4].
Complex systems consist of a set of simple elements which interact
with each other and the environment and change in time as result
of these mutual interaction. In psychiatry and the life sciences the
study of complex systems has been identified as a potential source
of new ideas and viewpoints [5–13] as the brain can also be seen as
a complex system [14]. I.e. Peled [15,16] suggested to use concepts
from systems theory to form an innovative diagnostic framework
The neurodevelopmental theory of schizophrenia has been
supported by computer simulations of neural information
processing. Hoffman and McGlashan reported a body of research
on schizophrenia [17–20] resulting in a pathophysiological model
coined Developmentally Reduced Synaptic Connectivity [21].
This model specifically posits that schizophrenia arises from
critically reduced synaptic connectivity as a result of developmen-
tal disturbances of synaptogenesis and supports the neurodevel-
opmental theory.
Both research efforts depend greatly on computer models and
complicated mathematical ideas which are unfamiliar to most
psychiatrists. However, the ideas developed in both fields have
great heuristic value. In this paper we will try to visualize findings
using concepts from the behavior of complex systems.
This article will first briefly introduce some basic principles of
computer models of mental processes, so-called Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN). A conceptual framework which is related to the
functioning of ANN is described and we show how this conceptual
framework can be visualized. This is the visual metaphor we seek
to describe. Subsequently, we describe how implementing
developmental disturbances in ANN give rise to pathological
phenomena, what their relationship is with ‘real-life’ pathology
and how these phenomena can be understood in terms of the
visual metaphor we introduced. Finally, we will show how
psychotic symptoms originating from dopamine disturbances can
be understood in terms of this visual metaphor.
Results
Introducing the metaphor (1): artificial neural networks
and attractors
There is an extensive body of literature on the principles of
ANN [22–24]. We describe a certain class of ANN, the attractor
neural network [23–26].
Figure 1 shows a network consisting of 100 artificial neurons
(AN’s) (figure 1, top, left). Each AN is connected with every other
AN by means of connections of random strength (For clarity, only
connections between neighboring AN’s are shown). Each AN
receives input from each of the 99 other AN’s. Each AN can be
active (‘1’) or inactive (‘0’ or ‘21’). For example, the influence of
each set of 99 AN’s on the remaining one is given by the sum of
the products of the number representing active or inactive and the
strength of the corresponding connection. The remaining AN is
itself active or inactive depending on whether the sum exceeds a
certain threshold value or not. In this way, all the AN’s
continuously and mutually influence each other making this
ANN a dynamic system. The functioning of this network can be
simulated with a computer.
It is possible to present this ANN a certain pattern, for instance,
a pattern that symbolizes the letter ‘A’ (figure 1, top, middle). The
network is constructed such that connections between AN’s which
are simultaneously active become stronger; connections which are
not simultaneously active become weaker.
After pattern ‘A’ has been presented, this mechanism will have
strengthened the connections in the ANN in such a way that
pattern ‘A’ has become imprinted in the connections between the
AN’s (figure 1, top, right). Pattern ‘A’ has now become an attractor
of the network dynamics: the network has learned ‘A’ (‘learning
can be regarded as collecting new attractors’ [19]. An attractor
implies a preferent state of a dynamic system.
What this means is shown in figure 1 (bottom, left). In the left-
hand side of the figure, some part of ‘A’ is presented. The activity
of the ANN is continuously updated (figure 1, bottom, middle).
The dynamic behavior of the network will finally be attracted
towards pattern ‘A’, the attractor of the network (igure 1, bottom,
right). The ANN is now said to have recognized the ‘A’ pattern.
An ANN can have several attractors.
Introducing the metaphor (2): visualizing the behavior of
neural systems as a trajectory through state space
The behavior of systems like an ANN can be described with so-
called ‘state space’ representations and from this concept we derive
the ‘visual metaphor’ we like to introduce.
Mathematically, all the states in which the ANN can exist can
be represented by a multidimensional ‘space’. The basic idea can
be introduced by considering one neuron with two possible states,
‘firing’ (‘1’) and ‘non-firing’ (‘0’). These two states can be
graphically depicted as two points. Over time, the dynamical
behavior of this one-neuron ‘system’ can be represented by a
trajectory that jumps between the two possible states. Similarly, a
two-neuron system can exist in four different states and performs a
trajectory that moves between these four points in a two-
dimensional space; hence the term ‘state space’.
From a mathematical point of view, there is no difference with
respect to the situation describing systems consisting of N neurons.
They describe a trajectory through a N-dimensional space.
Unfortunately, this situation cannot be visualized.
We propose to simplify this high-dimensional situation to the
depiction of a plane with the different states as points in the plane
(see figure 2, top; see also Globus and Arpaia [8] and Beer [13]. In
fact we performed some kind of intuitive principal component
analysis by assuming that relevant variance occurs in limited
directions [13].
This plane represents the collection of states in which the system
can exist. (Throughout we should keep in mind that in fact we are
dealing with a multi-dimensional space which cannot be
graphically shown).
An attractor (a learned pattern) can be represented as a dent in
this plane (figure 2, center). The magnitude of the attractor,
commonly described as the basin of attraction, represents the
influence of the attractor over its surroundings. In psychological
terms, it represents how much of a stored memory has to be ‘fed
into’ the neural system in order for the ANN to perform an
associative recollection of the memory. Changing from one state to
another can be conceptualized as the movement of a ball over the
surface [27]. In time, the system ‘moves over the plane’: it takes
different states and by doing so performs a trajectory through the
state space. With this conceptual framework we have a visual tool
Schizophrenia
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to aid our understanding of the functioning of the ANN. Because
of its analogy with the movement of a ball over a landscape we
have coined it a ‘visual metaphor’.
Presenting a pattern to an ANN can be likened to moving a ball
over the surface and letting it loose. The system will then seek
some state guided by the attractors which dominate the systems’
behavior and will settle in one of its attractors (figure 2, center). A
situation in which several attractors are present is shown in figure 2
(bottom). Throughout, we must keep in mind that this visual
representation is a metaphor for what are essentially abstract
mathematical concepts.
For a proper understanding, one has to imagine the dynamic
aspects of the whole process. So, the state of the ANN is
continuously moving through the space of its possible states guided
by external influences and attractors with the ANN simultaneously
creating new attractors which can be regarded as memory traces
[15]. Moreover, in this kind of system, small changes in the state of
the system can result in major changes in the final state of the
system. These changes are known as phase transitions and appear
when the system is near bifurcation points: unstable states in which
the system chooses between one or another final state to evolve to.
Such sudden changes in the state of the system can be imagined as
popcorn, ‘popping’ from one attractor to another [17].
Using the metaphor (1): the neurodevelopmental theory,
ANN and psychopathology
Efforts to simulate schizophrenic pathology using ANN assumed
that schizophrenia arises from reductions in connectivity between
brain regions as a result of developmental disturbances during
synaptogenesis [28,29]. A first effort used the 10610 ANN
described earlier. After learning this ANN a number of symbols, a
pruning rule was imposed on the ANN, removing weak
connections [15]. However, at higher levels of pruning, the
ANN demonstrated pathology. One of the findings was that parts
of the network would tend to re-create a pattern of activation that
did not correspond to any particular stored memory. It was
hypothesized that autonomous activation of cortical areas arising
independent of activity in other areas would be subjectively
experienced as hallucinations or the experience that one’s thoughts
are being controlled by outside forces.
We can visualize this situation using the introduced metaphor
(see figure 3, bottom).
Excessive pruning has created a so-called ‘parasitic’ attractor.
Input will not bring the ANN into the regions in state space which
correspond to a previously learned symbol but to a newly emerged
attractor. The re-creation of the pattern can be interpreted as
autonomous activation of the ANN. In terms of dynamical
Figure 1. Learning an attractor network to recognize patterns. Figure 1, top, (left): a network with 100 units with connections of random
strength and with no specific pattern learned (for clarity only neighbouring connections are shown). Figure 1, top (middle and right): learning pattern
‘A’. Top (middle): presenting ‘A’; top (right): connections between units related to ‘A’ are strengthened. Figure 1, bottom, (left): presenting part of ‘A’.
Bottom (right): the network has succeeded in retrieving ‘A’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002577.g001
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behavior the pathologically configured ANN is performing an
inappropriate trajectory through its state space. (Through a region
of its state space not corresponding to any previously learned
pattern, hence ‘inappropriate’).
Later studies involved a more complex ANN (a back-
propagation network with a recurrent layer) focusing on
developmentally disturbed speech processing as a source of
auditory hallucinations [20,30]. Normal human speech is a
complex task given the high level of acoustic ambiguity. Normal
perception of a word depends not only on acoustic input
corresponding to the word itself but also on previously perceived
words and intrinsic knowledge of how words are sequenced into
larger messages. The process involves verbal working memory that
uses expectations based on prior words and phrases.
This ANN used featured a verbal working memory with
linguistic expectations built up from prior exposure to a training
set of grammatical correct sentences. The training set consisted of
sentences like ‘‘Jane kiss girl’’ or ‘‘Cop chase man’’. The ANN was
programmed to process degraded input signals into identifiable
words. The ANN was posited to ‘hallucinate’ when it recognized
words during periods of input silence.
Pruning of connections initially improved detection rates of
phonetically degraded words. Higher levels of pruning however
were associated with progressive impairment in word recognition
and the emergence of hallucinations.
Turning to the visual metaphor to describe what is happening
(see figure 4) we should conceptualize the state space and its
‘attractor landscape’ as to a certain extent dynamical itself.
Figure 4 (top) depicts the starting situation in which linguistic
concepts are depicted as attractors. The basins of attraction
influence the trajectory through the state space as we have
described for the simple ANN.
Figure 4 (center) shows the system ‘hearing’ a degraded acoustic
stimulus (‘J?ne’). Due to the attractor dynamics (these depent on
the basin of attraction of ‘Jane’ as well as the state the system is in)
the network might succeed in recognizing ‘J?ne’ as ‘Jane’.
Perceiving a word (like ‘‘Jane’’) will change basins of attraction
(depending on prior expectations, i.e. the training set of sentences),
and as a consequence the most likely trajectories that subsequently
will be followed. Thus perceiving ‘‘Jane’’ will enlarge the basin of
attraction of ‘‘kiss’’ and other words the ANN has learned to
associate with ‘‘Jane’’ and at the same time shrink the basin of
attraction of concepts associated with, for instance, ‘‘cop’’. This
situation is shown in figure 4 (bottom).
As a result, after perceiving ‘‘Jane’’, the most likely trajectories
will lead to regions of state space associated with ‘‘Jane’’ (like ‘‘kiss’’
Figure 2. Dynamical behavior of a network as a trajectory in state space guided by attractors (for clarity repulsors are not shown).
Figure 2, top: different states of a network represented by points in a plane: the state space. A random situation is shown. Figure 2, center: an
attractor representing ‘A’ symbolised as a dent in state space. Changes in the state of the network can be regarded as a trajectory through state
space. Figure 2, bottom: attractors with variably sized basins (representing the influence of the attractor) and variable depths (representing the
preference of the system to stay in the attractor).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002577.g002
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or whatever other words the ANN due to its prior expectations
expects to follow ‘‘Jane’’).
The pruning process facilitates this process by improving the
capacity to recognize degraded input, probably by enlarging
basins of attraction and facilitating common trajectories (like
‘‘Jane’’R ‘‘kiss’’R ‘‘girl’’). However, the drawback is that after a
certain point recognizing becomes ‘too good’, and the system starts
off to follow trajectories without any input: the system starts
‘hallucinating’.
Using the metaphor (2): dopamine and schizophrenia
There is considerable evidence suggesting a role for dopamine
involvement in schizophrenia, particularly motivated by the
efficacy of antipsychotic medication, which derive their therapeu-
tic effects from dopamine D2 antagonism [31]. Usually, research
focusing on the role of dopamine in schizophrenia adresses two
aspects of dopamine neuromodulation, namely (1) the role of exess
dopaminergic stimulation in delusions, and (2) the role of low
levels of prefrontal dopamine in working memory. The metaphor
we present should be able to capture aspects of these roles of
dopamine in schizophrenia.
General aspects of the role of dopamine in neural system
dynamics
An increasing body of research suggests that dopamine is a
modulator of the signal-to-noise ratio of the neural system. One of
the first to suggest this role were Servan-Schreiber et al [32]. In the
metaphor presented, a crucial role is played by the attractor
concept. The way in which information is processed is influenced
by the shape and depth of the attractors and by the ease in which
the system can settle into an attractor and perform transitions from
one attractor into another. Changing the signal-to-noise ratio, in
terms of ‘information processing with attractors’, comes down to
changing the depth of the attractors and changing the magnitude
of the basins of attraction.
Low levels of dopamine are associated with a low signal-to-noise
ratio and in attractors terms this is equivalent to shallow attractors
with large basins of attractions. In this situation frequent
transitions from one attractor to another can take place (see
figure 5, bottom). Servan-Schreiber at al [32] suggested that this is
the psychological equivalent of relatively unfocused, associative
thinking.
High levels of dopamine are associated with a large signal-to-
noise ratio and this comes down to the existence of a limited
number of deep atractors with relatively large basins of attraction
which dominate the information processing of the neural system
(figure 5, top). Such a situation will be present in a situation of
focused attention.
Excess dopaminergic stimulation in delusions
Recently, Kapur (1) presented an heuristic framework on the
role of dopamine in delusions. In Kapur’s model a central role of
dopamine is to mediate the salience of environmental events. A
(striatal) hyperdopaminergic state would lead, at a psychological
level, to the aberrant assignment of salience to one’s experience.
Aberrant, because salience is assigned to experiences which (in
fact) have none or only minor salience. Subsequently, delusions are
the cognitive effort to make sense of aberrantly salient experiences.
Kapur (1) provides a psychological description of the role of
dopamine. Within the framework we presented (based on
‘information-processing with attractors’) an abormal hyperdopa-
minergic state is equivalent to the emergence of an attractor with a
large basin of attraction which dominates the striatal information
processing of the neural system. This dominance translates itself in
‘aberrant salience’. This is the situation depicted in figure 5 (top).
Low prefrontal dopamine in working memory
Whereas hyperdopaminergic states in the striatum have been
associated with delusions, reduced dopaminergic activity in the
prefronal cortex has been associated with disorders of working
memory [33,34]. Usually it is assumed that the prefrontal cortex is
responsible for representing and maintaining task-relevant infor-
mation, an idea related to the ideas of Goldman-Rakic concerning
the role of the prefrontal cortex in working memory. Dopamine is
involved in maintaining task-relevant information in the prefrontal
cortex [35].
Schizophrenia patients show several deficits in psychological
tasks, specifically in tasks that place a demand on the active
maintenance of internal representations of the context of the task.
Cohen & Servan-Schreiber [35] concluded that performance
deficits in schizophrenia are due to a degradation in the internal
representation required as context for processing stimuli. In a state
of reduced prefrontal dopaminergic activity noise interferes with
the ability of the system to maintain a representation of task-
relevant information. In the framework we presented this comes
down to the situation depicted in figure 5 (bottom) where the
system is liable to transitions to other attractors due to small
internal or external perturbations of the system. The resulting
inability of the system to maintain a stable attractor state over time
shows itself at a psychological level as the observed disorders of
working memory. More generally, this will lead to an uncontrolled
spread of activation and an increase of spontaneous neuronal
activity, hence, to a decreased signal-to-noise ratio [34]. Similar
results have been described in a neural network simulation
performed by Peled & Geva [36].
More recent insights have focused on the differential effects of
D1- and D2- dopamine receptor stimulation in the prefrontal
cortex [34,37,38]. Durstewitz [38] argues, partly based on neural
network simulations [39,40], that D1-stimulation could increase
the energy barrier between different network states, making it
harder to switch from one state to the other. Due to this, active
Figure 3. Pathology shown as disturbances in state space (see
text). Figure 3, top: ‘normally’ sized attractors (cf figure 2, bottom).
Figure 3, bottom: aberrant neurodevelopmental processes (i.e. exces-
sive pruning) give rise to a spurious attractor: situations and concepts
become malclassified (interpreted after 17). This may lead to the
subjective experience of delusions or hallucinations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002577.g003
Schizophrenia
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memory states become more robust to distractors and interference.
In dynamical terms, D1-induced changes come down to a
deepening and widening of the basins of attraction of prefrontal
cortex attractor states (figure 5, top).
The combined effects of D1- and D2-receptor stimulation cause
dopamine to drive neural networks through a sequence of phases
with opposing characteristics. In the case of prefrontal cortex this
may consist of an initial phase where basins of attraction are
flattened out (a D2-dominated situation making networks highly
susceptible to newly incoming information –see figure 5, bottom),
and a late phase (D1-dominated) where network activity is focused
on a few relevant states (figure 5, top). Thus, this mechanism is
used to ‘protect’ task relevant information against the interfering,
and cumulative effects of noise over time [36].
The metaphor as part of a broader information
processing concept
The terms we used are derived from the theory on complex
dynamical systems. In this concept the brain is seen as a system
that is in constant interaction with its environment, possessing a
great number of preferential states in which the system
sequentially relaxes [15,41]. These preferential states are attractors
of the systems’ dynamics. They are the result of the physical
structure of the system and past experiences which have influenced
the system. The outside world influences the present situation of
the system persistently, causing the system to temporarily relax in a
state most fit to this ongoing process of mutual influence.
Homeostatic mechanisms produce stability as well as phase
transitions, making the healthy system adaptive to its environment.
Psychopathology arises when the system becomes either too stable
or too unstable, whether by (acute or chronic) external influences
or by limitations in the system itself. In most pathological
circumstances, there will be a constant interaction between the
system and the environment, resulting in a more or less
pathological equilibrium.
It has been suggested to name these aspects of neural
functioning which focuses on the system properties of neural
ensembles neurodynamics [12,15,42,43].
Our approach has been to simplify and visualize these processes,
in order to produce an intuitive understanding.
Discussion
Ideally, medical thinking depends on the understanding of both
physical reality and the availability of a metaconcept describing
Figure 4. Dynamical aspects of the ‘attractor landscape’ (see also text). Figure 4, top: meaningful acoustical signals have created an
‘attractor landscape’. Figure 4, center: recognizing a (degraded) signal, ic ‘Jane’. Figure 4, bottom: after recognizing ‘Jane’ the basins of attraction of
concepts associated with ‘Jane’ (acoustical signals, likely to follow ‘Jane’) temporarily increase, facilitating the capacity to recognize subsequent input
(i.e. the most likely words to follow Jane).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002577.g004
Schizophrenia
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reality in a more abstract way. For instance, in cancer research,
the metaconcept is ‘regulation of cell proliferation’, with
‘misregulation’ as its associated pathological state [44]. The
physical reality is the way in which the bio-physical apparatus of
genes and proteins perform regulation of cell proliferation.
The line of reasoning introduced in this paper tries to approach
this situation. The metaconcept defined is based on information
processing theory (namely, information processing with attractors
[45,46]), the neurobiological process described (pruning of the
dendritic tree) is functionally related with the metaconcept,
Figure 5. Modulatory effects of dopamine shown as changes in state space (interpreted after 30)(see also text). Figure 5, top:
increasing levels of dopamine augment the signal-to-noise ratio: the basin of the attractor associated with the most salient signal increases while the
basins of attraction of the other attractors decrease. Note also the increase respectively decrease of the depth of the attractors reflecting a increased
respectively decreased tendency of the system to stay in the attractor. Figure 5, bottom: decreasing levels of dopamine reduce the signal-to-noise
ratio: the basins of attraction and the depth of the attractors become more similar resulting in an enhanced tendency of the system to make
transitions from one attractor to another.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002577.g005
Schizophrenia
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(pruning optimizes information processing), pathology is under-
stood as arising from disturbances of this neurobiological process
(excessive pruning) and the associated pathological phenomena are
expressed in terms of the metaconceptual framework (emergence
of pathological attractors). Moreover, neuromodulatory influences
(dopamine) can be described in terms of the metaconcepts as well.
In psychiatry, there is a large conceptual gap between empirical
research and theory which -especially in brain research- must be
bridged by an interdisciplinary formal language [47]. In this
respect, ‘systems science’ or ‘computational neuroscience’ offers a
conceptual and methodological basis for integrating the various
data within a sophisticated system framework.
In this context, we think that some ‘metaphorization’ of
psychological categories into cybernetic language might be useful
to bridge this gap.
Throughout history, the working of the brain has been
compared to that of a clock-work, a steam engine and, most
recently, to a digital computer or a hologram [48,49]. The
metaphor presented in this article is derived from dynamical
systems theory and is a visual representation of the mathematical
concepts underlining this theory.
We expect that the conceptual framework and metaphor
described in this article offers a tool to understand psychiatric
phenomena from a systems perspective. At the same time, we are
dealing with a line of thought which is related with the actual
behavior of neural systems, so the terminology used, though of an
abstract nature, has a close relationship with the processes in the
brain. Moreover, it facilitates to appreciate relationships between
related phenomena in different fields of science, describing
properties and phenomena of neural systems as more specific
instances of general principles underlying behavior of all kinds of
complex dynamical systems. It therefore satisfies the scientific
endeavour to recognize specific behavior (like the behavior of
neural sytems) as instances of more general behavior (like the
behavior of complex systems) and to construct a conceptual
framework describing this general behavior.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that theories and models
need not be ‘explanations’ of observed phenomena but can also be
useful as exploratory ‘heuristics’ [47]. The presented model might
serve this purpose.
Methods
This is an essay-like study aimed to contruct visualized concepts
stemming from the theory on dynamical complex systems to be
used as a ‘visual metaphor’ to bridge the mental- and molecular-
biological domains in schizophrenia.
The background for this study has been formed by a PubMed
search with the terms (‘neural network’ OR ‘connectionism’ OR
‘parallel distributed processing’ OR ‘nonlinear systems’ OR
‘complex systems’) AND (‘schizophren*’ OR ‘psychosis’ OR
‘psychotic’ OR ‘psychiatr*’).
The general concept of a (visual) metaphor is inspired by the
work of Globus & Arpaia [6], Draaisma [48,49], and Ouzounis &
Maziere [50].
To introduce the sought-after metaphor we first describe a
computer model of neural information processing. We then show
how the information processing in this model can be visualized,
using concepts from the theory on complex systems. Finally, we
use the visual metaphor to describe disturbed information
processing and dopamine neuromodulation in schizophrenia.
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